How not to write an article on quantum encryption.
Can you spot what's missing in
this article?
Toshiba Research Europe has used the science of quantum cryptography to transmit voice and video over a secure fiber link that is protected by the laws of physics. The demonstration is significant because it shows that the single-photon encryption technology is not only compatible with real Internet Protocol (IP) traffic but also robust enough for deployment on commercial fiber networks.
The system was shown to financial institutions and government representatives in London last week by scientists working at Toshiba’s Cambridge Research Laboratory.
Toshiba’s “Quantum Key Server” can generate up to 100 quantum (single-photon) keys per second, enough to encrypt each video frame with a separate key. In addition, it features an automatic management system that continually monitors and adjusts the system’s optical path length to allow it to operate continuously without any need for user intervention.
If you remember the things I talked about in my previous posts on
quantum cryptography and
RSA encryption, you should be scratching your head wondering something right now. There's a critical piece of information missing, and it's nowhere to be found in the article that I quoted. Go ahead and follow the link and read the article. I read it three times before I was convinced that they really had left it out.
Nowhere do they state what the length of the key is! Nowhere! How in the world can anyone write an article, where they make a point about how fast this new system can send the quantum information, without telling you the data rate? Talking about sending 100 keys per second is meaningless if they don't say how long the key is!
Okay, let me calm down and explain. Recall that, using quantum key distribution, you can share random bits between two users, and these bits form your key. One user uses his key to encrypt his data, which he then sends over a public channel, and the other user receives the encrypted data and uses his key to decrypt it. Since they have the same key, transmitted securely, they can share encrypted data confident that no one else can decrypt it. The trick here is that quantum key distribution allows you to transmit the key securely, but it's
slow. Very slow. For one, you end up losing three-quarters of your data up front, and the more secure you want to make the transmission, the more data you have to toss aside. So some day it may be possible for quantum key distribution to distribute the key at somewhere around one-quarter the speed of the open, unsecured data line. Someday. The technological difficulty of transmitting and detecting one photon at a time, which is necessary for quantum key distribution, makes it even slower. The highest data rates are somewhere around 10 kbps (10,000 bits per second), as I mentioned in a
previous post. For complete security, your key has to be as long as your data, meaning it will take longer to send the key than to send the data.
Now, you can use a key shorter than your data length. It won't be as good of an encryption, but you can encrypt data with keys which are much smaller than the data you're encrypting, just using the same key over and over. The problem is with a short key, a hacker who intercepts the encrypted message can just keep trying possible key values over and over until he gets an output that makes sense. For example, you can encrypt a phrase with an 8-bit key, but it will take someone no more than 256 tries to find the right key, and once he finds it, he'll know, since the decrypted phrase will make sense. Now if your key is as long as your data, then no key he tries could differentiate it from any other phrase of the same length.
So let's say you have a quantum key distribution system running in parallel to the data you're sending, but much slower. The best way to use it is to produce a key, say 100 bits in length, and use it to encrypt the next 100,000 bits of data. Then, when you produce another 100 bit key, you use it to encrypt the next 100 kb block of data. This works well when you have a 10 kbps quantum key distribution system and a 10 Mbps open data channel. This is what's being done in this article. They produce a key, encrypt some amount of data, then produce a new key and encrypt then next block of data, and so on. They can do this 100 times a second, enough that if they're transmitting video, each frame can have its own encryption. (This is actually an understatement, as video framerates are typically somewhere between 10 fps and 60 fps.) There's just one tiny problem--they don't tell you what the key length is! Without that information, talking about the number of keys is meaningless. The key could be only 10 bits long, in which case this is an exceedingly slow quantum key distribution system with a 1 kbps key data rate. It could be 100 bits, which means it's about average as quantum key distribution systems go at 10 kbps. Without telling you the length of the key, they aren't telling you the key distribution data rate, which is the number of keys times the length of the key. What's the point in talking about the number of keys if they don't tell you the key length?
I had to do a bit of hunting around the internet until I could find an article which said what the data rate is. A surprising number of articles neglected to say.
This one finally shed some light on it (and it
still didn't give the information the proper emphasis):
Their system is capable of generating 100 quantum 'keys' every second. This is fast enough for every individual frame of video to be protected by its own encryption. "This makes the system highly secure," says Andrew Shields, who leads the Cambridge team. "It would take an enormous computational resource to crack this frame by frame."
...
The Toshiba system creates keys made of 256 'bits', where each bit is a photon speeding along a fibre-optic cable. A photon represents either one or zero depending on whether it arrives slightly early or late at its destination. By passing a series of messages between the sender and receiver, both can arrive at a secure, mutually agreed key.
So, it's a 256 bit key, transmitted 100 times per second, a distribution rate of approximately 25 kbps, roughly 2.5 times the previous state of the art. Not bad, but do you think they could bother making sure that information is emphasized next time? I know I should blame the reporters for missing that crucial piece of information, and I do, but I think that if Toshiba had emphasized it, they might have picked up on that fact.