Back of the Envelope

I found this article by Jeffrey Friedman in NRO to be incredibly interesting, partly because it touches on one of my pet peeves. Here's an excerpt before I add my two cents:

At the end of the 19th century, growing government power placed more and more complicated questions, such as those raised by economic regulation, onto the political agenda. This required the electorate to master more and more information in order to vote intelligently. Not coincidentally, at the same time the overtly partisan newspapers of the 19th century were replaced by media that, following the lead of the New York Times, prided themselves on being fair to all "legitimate" points of view. The new, nonpartisan media assured conscientious voters that they could understand the complexities of modern politics by trusting journalists to present, as part of "all the news that's fit to print," both (1) a balanced account of various partisan arguments, and (2) an objective account of "the facts," which would allow voters to decide which partisan claims are correct.

The main problem with this model of journalism is not, as Okrent seems to think, whether it leans too heavily toward (1) balancing opinions instead of (2) presenting an objective account of "undeniable" facts. The real difficulty is that neither a true balance of opinions nor an objective reporting of facts is likely if politics is complicated. But the reason people feel the need to turn to "nonpartisan" journalists to help sort out political issues is precisely that-especially since the advent of big government-politics is very complicated indeed.

The new model of journalism solved the problem of complexity only in the sense of wishing it away. The facts about the problems modern governments try to solve would have to be pretty simple if the journalist could make sense of them without himself needing to be an expert. But if the political world that simple, readers would need journalists to sort it out just as little as Okrent thinks journalists need experts. Okrent's "just the facts, ma'am" approach is based on the same wishful thinking that stood behind the new model of journalism.

In the new model of journalism, reporters need to put their views into the mouths of experts so they can appear to be taking adequate account of the world's complexity. But the unspoken assumption behind the media's complacent invocation of expertise is, in reality, that the facts of the political world, when not immediately plain to the reporter, are at least clear to people who make a career of studying them: people who are "experts." These specialists need only relay their "findings" to the journalist--who, in turn, needs only report them to the public--for the public to gain a clear understanding of the world.

In a world that straightforward, honest experts wouldn't disagree with each other-which Okrent appears to think is the case. The truth, of course, is that honest experts disagree with each other all the time-which calls into doubt the expertise of some or all of them. When two people disagree, at least one of them must be wrong.

Honest experts' disagreements are rooted in the very thing to which the new model of journalism pays only lip service: the difficulty of making sense of the modern world. In the face of the world's complexity, the interpretation offered by a given expert will tend to reflect his theoretical — including ideological — assumptions as much as, or more than, it springs from his direct contact with "undeniable truths."

One of my biggest pet peeves is when people state opinions as facts, something which is particularly dangerous when an expert is talking to a non-expert. Experts often do this when talking to each other, but when talking to other experts who know the material and are adept at separating fact from opinion, it isn't all that dangerous. It's part of the background noise, and you take it into account when weighing what the other person has to say.

Among scientists, it's even easier, since scientific papers are usually divided between the experimental data and the analysis. The data should be accurate as a matter of scientific ethics--people who falsify their data are obviously not honest experts--but the analysis can invoke a great deal of opinion. Often, it's a non-controversial opinion: you apply the standard scientific model and you come up with this explanation for the data. But other times it can be very controversial, especially when your analysis shows problems with the standard model. Guess which papers make the mainstream media.

When experts, scientific or political, talk to non-experts, such as journalists, they are rarely careful to separate the data from the analysis, and even less careful when it comes to saying "This method of analysis is pretty standard and non-controversial, but that one is where we substitute our brand-new and, for the most part, untested, model." That is where the conflation of fact and opinion are most dangerous, and it's something I try to be careful of. (I'm not an expert on most of the things that I write about, but I do have a Ph.D., so there are some things I could get away with calling myself an "expert" on.) I'd ask that all experts, as a matter of principle, be likewise careful.

Who knew? (from Instapundit) Kyoto was always a really bad idea economically, and it tended to discourage some promising solutions in the effort to fix everything right now. It is untenable for third world nations which need to develop economically before they can put a cap on emissions. And while Bush is always blamed for it failing, the Senate had already voted against the treaty 95-0, and as the Senate must approve all treaties... yes, I'm afraid it wasn't Bush who stopped this one.

I've been thinking of upgrading my cell phone, but it looks like I'll have to wait for the one I really want. It's the Sony Ericsson S710. It's a phone, a camera (with flash), and an MP3 player. So it's a little bit big. Okay, it's a lot big. I guess I won't be able to fit this into my pocket.