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Sunday, February 26, 2006

God or Not Carnival
Once again, the God or Not carnival is looking for more theist submissions on the topic of "Truth". The deadline ha been pushed back until 2:30 pm on Monday. Send your submissions to submit-at-godornot-dot-com with the following information:
  • author’s name (or handle)
  • position: GOD or NOT? (please select one)
  • the title of the blog on which it appears
  • the title of the post
  • a short description of the post (one or two sentences)
  • a link directly to the post (permalink)
  • the trackback URL (if different)

Thanks for your participation!

Friday, January 27, 2006

God or Not Carnival thoughts: Sola Scriptura
God blogger Mathetes argued in his contribution to the last God or Not Carnival that sola scriptura was illogical:
A question that has always been at the forefront of all of my endeavors with sola scriptura or, strictly text-based religions, (i.e. religions that take their meaning, truth, guidance and importance from scripture; religions like Judaism, Islam and protestant Christianity) is the problem of interpretation. The problem, as it pertains to Islam and protestant Christianity, goes something like this:

1.There are many interpretations of the Qur’an/Bible
2.Islam and protestant Christianity claim to be absolutely true (in most cases)
3.Therefore one interpretation of the Qur’an/Bible is the correct interpretation
4.There is no authority under either Islam or protestant Christianity that tells which interpretation is correct.
5.Therefore the Absolute truth claims of Islam or Christianity are either
a. false, because they are wrong
b. irrelevant, because the correct interpretation under the presuppositions of the two positions is impossible to be known leaving us skeptics.

This is most certainly a big question for Muslims and protestant Christians alike. If they do not have a correct interpretation of the Qur’an/bible, they don’t have truth. How would a protestant Christian or a Muslim go about finding an answer to this? I hope to be able to show what resources, faculties and thoughts both Muslims and Christians might begin to use to examine this argument.

I believe that this is an incorrect interpretation of what sola scriptura means. From, of all things, the Wikipedia definition:
Sola scriptura reverses the order of the Church's authority, as it is understood in the Catholic tradition: Instead of the Catholic Church's teaching authority being the interpreter of Scripture, sola scriptura makes Scripture the interpreter of tradition. For this reason, it is called the formal cause of the Reformation.

Sola scriptura did not originally signify a radical rejection of all authority of the Church to interpret the Scriptures, but rather represented a claim that the teaching authority of the Church is regulated by the Bible, constrained by Scripture in both a limiting and a directing sense. As John Wesley stated in the 18th century, "The Church is to be judged by the Scriptures, not the Scriptures by the Church." The Reformers argued that the Scriptures are guaranteed to remain true to their divine source, and thus, only insofar as the Church retains scriptural faith is it assured of all the promises of God.

Sola scriptura holds that the Bible is the most reliable source of authority on the Christian faith. It is not, however, the only source of authority.

If I believed that the tradition of the Church (not referring narrowly to the Catholic Church, but to the broad family of believers throughout history), other historical sources, archeology, and reason had no authority, then indeed I would be hard pressed to find a non-circular reason to believe in the Bible's authority. However, these things do have authority, and even though none of them have the same authority as the Bible themselves, they do affirm its greater authority. You may wonder how a greater authority can be derived from lesser ones. It is basic inductive logic, the same as is used in science all the time. No particular experiment has any great authority, but the sum of them allows us to derive the scientific laws which have great authority.

The same principle is used in interpreting scripture. While none of these things are the ultimate authority in interpreting scripture, they each can contribute to our understanding. The ultimate authority in scriptural interpretation, though, is the Holy Spirit. We believe that the Spirit works to teach us truth when we study the Word of God with humility. But what should we make of the wildly different conclusions reached by Christians about various theological points, such as free will and predestination? I would argue, and I think most Evangelicals feel this way, that those points of contention which Christians have argued over for hundreds of years may not be as important as we think they are. Our specific beliefs about the details are a lot less important than an active faith that lives out the clear teachings of Jesus.

Tuesday, January 24, 2006

God or Not Carnival thoughts: Cherry-picking
The Evangelical Atheist argues that it's impossible to take the Bible to be partly literal and partly figurative:
If some passages (aside from the “literal figurative passages” previously mentioned) are taken as literal and others are not, one must be able to defend the distinction. When challenged to do so, these people offer a few typical responses. One is to imply that all of the self-contradictory parts are figurative. This is a convenient but baseless argument that works backward from a comfortable conclusion. Another response is to say that some of the miraculous passages are figurative because they couldn’t really have happened the way they’re written. However, which is more absurd: the resurrection or the burning bush? If any of the extraordinary portions are taken as literally true, this argument falls apart.

The main problem with this argument is that it takes an overly simplistic view of the Bible, as if it's a single book written by a single person, rather than a collection of 66 books, many of which, arguably including Genesis, are also collections of stories from different sources. Thus it makes sense to look at each book on its own, for what it claims to be, in order to decide if it's literal or figurative. The gospels claim to be eyewitness accounts of Jesus's life and ministries. They contain repeated refrains that this is either the account of witnesses or painstakingly researched (the end of John and the beginning of Luke, in particular). You may disagree, but if so, you have to conclude that the account is not just figurative, that it is inherently dishonest.

Some books can be taken either way. There can be disagreement over Job, for instance. Its poetic form, with the prologue and epilogue recounting events in Heaven, suggest a figurative account to some, while others see no reason to discount the events, even if they've been rendered into poetic form. The poetic dialogue may summarize the central arguments of a real debate among real people, even if they didn't speak in poetry at the time.

Genesis, if taken to be what the most literal interpretation of Divine Inspiration calls it, is God's description to Moses of his actions in history and relationship with his chosen people up to that moment. Others believe that it is a collection of the oral stories of the Israelites collected by Moses. Taken that way, these stories can be treated individually according to their genres, and the question of figurative or literal meaning dealt with for each story separately, not as a whole.

The creation account of Genesis 1 has some formulas which suggest a figurative meaning. The first three days consist of the creation of the kingdoms: light and dark on the first day, air and water on the second, and earth on the third. The second set of three days concern the creation of the rulers of those kingdoms: the sun and the moon on the fourth, the birds and the fish on the fifth, and animals and man on the sixth. Some Christians find this convincing evidence that the story is not meant literally, while others say that just because it follows a storytelling formula doesn't mean it didn't actually happen that way.

Thus I think the figurative vs. literal interpretation of each book has to be dealt with separately, and is often open for debate.

Monday, January 23, 2006

God or Not Carnival coming up
Chris Hallquist will be hosting the next God or Not Carnival on January 30th here at The Uncredible Hallq, on the topic of "The Definition of God." He's doesn't have very many "God" entries right now, so he asked me to post a request. If you'd like to make an entry, please send it to him through submit-at-godornot.com, and include the following:
  • author's name (or handle)
  • position: GOD or NOT?
  • the title of the blog on which it appears
  • the title of the post
  • a short description of the post (one or two sentences)
  • a link directly to the post (permalink)
  • the trackback URL (if different)

For more information, see the website. Entries are due on Friday, January 27th, at 11:59 pm.

Friday, January 20, 2006

God or Not Carnival thoughts
While hosting the God or Not Carnival, I of course had my own thoughts about the quality and nature of the arguments, but I was not allowed to comment on the posts themselves in the Carnival, and the manager of the Carnival asked me not to post any analysis in another blog entry until a few days after the carnival. To be honest, reading the entries was somewhat depressing, as very few of them, even among the "God" entries, agreed with my beliefs, and many of the posts were downright hostile, not merely argumentative. I will not attempt to go through the posts one by one, but there are a few arguments which I feel compelled to address. I am not interested in answering insult with insult, but I do need to explain and defend my own beliefs. Thus there are three arguments that I intend to address in the upcoming week:
  1. The first argument, made at the Evangelical Atheist, is that believers are inconsistent, in fact, intellectually dishonest, in believing some parts of the Bible to be literally true while believing that others are figurative. The Evangelical Atheist allows for the fact that some things are "literally figurative"--i.e., the text makes it clear they're figurative--but argues that this doesn't allow the Christian to regard the gospel stories as literal and the creation story in Genesis as figurative, as it's either all or nothing. He's correct that believers often choose literal vs. figurative as a matter of convenience, but he's taking an overly simplistic view of the Bible. There's more leeway than he allows.
  2. Theist Mathetes argues that sola scriptura religions are illogical, as they neither allow for any authority to interpret the scriptures nor do they allow for an authority which establishes the authority of the scriptures. I believe that he's misinterpreting what sola scriptura means, which I'll attempt to demonstrate.
  3. The final argument has little to do with scriptural literalism. It is instead the observation that the Bible contains a lot of bad stuff, and taking it seriously at all, whether literally or figuratively, requires belief in a God who is overtly evil. This was the view taken by The Uncredible Hallq, Kingdom of Heathen, and Skeptic Rant among the atheists, and Radical Goddess Thealogy among the theists. This is a serious objection to the God of the Bible and deserves a serious response, even if the hostility evinced in some of these posts seemed more designed to offend than to convince. I don't think God is evil, of course. I think our Western concepts of human worth and dignity would not exist without the influence of Christianity, so we would not even have the concepts by which we judge the God of the Bible without Him. I also think these bloggers are really making just a small part of a broader argument, the context of which I'll try to provide as I address their argument.

So that's what I intend to talk about in the upcoming week. Ambitious, isn't it? And dang, I need to get to work on revising Eyes of the Shadow some time soon. Well, I'll do my best.

Monday, January 16, 2006

God or Not Carnival: "Scriptural Literalism"
This week, Back of the Envelope is hosting the God or Not Carnival on the topic of Scriptural Literalism. As host, I'm not allowed to talk about my own opinions on this topic, or judge the submissions others have made, within the carnival. I'll do my best simply to summarize the arguments presented. I couldn't decide on a good organization, so I ultimately divided it between the "God" posts and the "Not" posts. Since Back of the Envelope is a "God" blog, I'll put the "Not" posts first.

Not

In "Scriptural Literalism," Breakerslion of Confusion of Ideas argues that since the internal contradictions make it impossible for a reasonable person to believe that the Bible is literally true, that the assertion that it is is really a litmus test to determine whether the religious follower will believe anything.

Chris Hallquist at The Uncredible Hallq offers a post called "Scriptural literalism is not the issue," where he says that it doesn't matter whether the Bible is literally true or not, that the character of the God described in the Bible is unworthy of worship should he exist at all.

I Am at The Evangelical Atheist offers us "Cherry-Picking (Not Literally)," saying that while it's consistent to argue that the Bible is figurative or that it is literal, it is intellectually dishonest to argue that some portions are literal while others are not except in the case of portions that are "literally figurative," which are clearly presented as figurative in the text.

Seth at the Kingdom of Heathen argues in "Fetch the Book of Armaments!" that those who don't take the Bible literally, yet look to it as a source of morals, are deluding themselves, as the Bible's "not a stable source of morals. It is inconsistent, vague, and downright outrageous."

In "Scriptural Literalism: the Patriarchal Divide," Reluctant Atheist of Bibliblography presents us with the argument that scriptural literalism is more a male phenomenon, due to the way that men think.

LBBP of Skeptic Rant presents "Scriptural Literalism," wherein he takes the view that if anyone truly took the Bible literally, it would require behavior which is far from acceptable to our society.

Francois Tremblay of Goosing the Antithesis submits his post "Applying induction to the 'holey' writ," using inductive reasoning to argue that it's absurd to select a single book as infallible.

God

Dwight Welch at the Religious Liberal Blog has a post called "embracing history," where he argues that no one is takes the Bible completely literally, and that those studying it need to first understand the historical context, and then interpret it through the lens of what Jesus said were the two greatest commandments: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind." and "You shall love your neighbor as yourself."

Trey at Daddy, Papa and Me presents the "Greatest Commandments," which takes a position identical to Dwight, that the Bible needs to be interpreted according to the Two Greatest Commandments. He does emphasize the last part of what Jesus said, that "All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments."

At Rev. Bill, the Reverend argues in "About Pat" that people such as Pat Robertson, using a literal interpretation of the Bible in order to try to explain current events miss the larger message of the Bible.

In "Bible: Literal or Figurative?", Brendan McPhillips at BrendanMcPhillips.com, takes a purely figurative view of the Bible and the stories of Creation, the Flood, and the Resurrection.

Chad at Eternal Revolution gives us "Pitfalls of Literal Interpretation," where he claims that it is possible to accept a metaphorical interpretation of many passages in the Bible without diluting or refuting their meaning.

In "On Scriptural Literalism," Jim Jordan at the Moral Science Club takes the view that the scriptures are infallible, in that they do not fail us, but they are not literal. This is a very long post.

Anne Johnson at The Gods are Bored gives us "Evidence for the Defense #4", a humorous story where Satan gives his version of what happened during Jesus's temptation in the wilderness.

Kristopher at Mathetes has a post titled "Interpretation," which says that sola scriptura, the view that scripture is the only source of authority, is illogical, as it does not acknowledge an authority for interpreting the scripture, and as it lacks a source to confirm the authority of the scriptures themselves.

Macht at Prosthesis, gives us "The Chimera of Biblical Literalism," where he argues that literalism and inerrancy are not the same thing, and that no one who believes in the Bible is a strict Biblical literalist.

Athana at Radical Goddess Thealogy sends "ERZEBET Dug HER OWN GRAVE — LITERALLY," where she uses the example of Fred Phelps to show the dangers of taking the Bible literally, but then goes on to argue that it doesn't matter if you take it literally or figuratively, the scriptures of the warrior god, whether Jewish, Christian, or Muslim, are so dangerous that they ought to be banned entirely as Weapons of Mass Destruction.



That's it, all the entries this time. As you can see, I didn't get a single post supporting the literal interpretation of the Bible, excepting those saying that the literal interpretation was reason to reject it.

Let me know if you see any problems with this post.

The next GOD or NOT Carnival, number seven, is on January 30th at The Uncredible Hallq, and the topic is "Definition of God."

Update: I added one last post, where I was late getting the necessary information. It was mostly my fault as I think I hit the wrong button and saved the e-mail with the info request rather than sending it.

Sunday, December 11, 2005

Debate Round 4: Donald on the Soul
I've been meaning to respond to Skeptic's argument for a while now. The problem is that I don't have much interest in debating the soul. Unlike Skeptic, who finds the soul debate more interesting, I find the debate on miracles to be the more interesting one. Skeptic challenges me to prove the existence of the soul. I challenge him to disprove it. Neither of us seems up to the task. I've attempted to explain what I think the soul is, but Skeptic finds it ridiculous, the stuff of science fiction. I shouldn't need to point out that most people whose cultures we know about not only did not find the concept of the soul ridiculous, they accepted the coexistence of the spiritual and the physical as the natural way of looking at the world. It precedes the existence of science as we know it by thousands of years, so I don't think "science fiction" is the appropriate term. Even today, in our culture, most people believe in the soul. Thus, I'm not sure how to respond to his argument that it sounds like science fiction. He may find the idea ridiculous, but that's more of an opinion than an argument. I can't argue against opinion.

I am going to take exception to his characterization that my conception of the soul requires that brain damage turns both brain and soul to mush, and here I'm afraid I'll have to come back to my computer analogy, where the brain is the hardware and the soul is the software. Software can run differently on different hardware. On faster computers with more memory, it can purr along at blazing speeds, while with computers without enough processing power or memory it trudges along and even crashes, unable to perform the tasks set before it. When the hardware is actually damaged, misinterpreting input and mangling output, corrupting data and miscalculating operations, the result can be a real mess, but none of this means that there's a problem with the software at all. That's the view I take of brain damage. There are problems with the brain, but there's no reason I see for there to be a problem with the soul as well.

In the broader argument, there are three arguments for the soul that I am familiar with. One is from consciousness, the argument that we must be more than the physical. Many and sundry philosophers have made this argument, and I would guess that Skeptic has heard it but has not found it very compelling. Admittedly, neither have I. In any case, neither of us seems to take a purely materialistic view of the mind, as Skeptic's view is emergent while mine is what's called dualistic. (I don't like the term, but I won't get into that here.) He seems to be under the misconception that the dualistic view is that the soul is the consciousness, rather than a necessary component to consciousness, but I've already argued that point. The second argument for the soul is observed evidence, in the form of ghosts, spirits, and near death experiences. As the evidences for these are anything but convincingly established, Skeptic is free to reject them. I don't reject them out of hand, but I haven't been convinced of their reality either. The third argument is from authority. Religious beliefs about the soul depend on the authority of the religion, and I readily admit that this is what convinces me. Arguments from authority don't mean much unless you've established the authority of the one you're drawing on. As I've spent a great deal of time examining the historicity and authority of the Bible, this I am prepared to argue, if Skeptic wishes it. Here, the argument boils down to the fact that I believe in the soul because Jesus's words confirm its existence, and I have reason to trust his words.

So, I admit, my main reason for believing in the soul is an argument from authority, one which I believe is well established and which I'm prepared to argue for. I will, of course, answer any logical objections to the soul without relying on appeals to authority, but there's not much I can do about opinion.

Saturday, October 8, 2005

Round 4: Skeptic On the Soul
As you may have noticed it has been quite some time since my last response. My school projects are mounting to a degree that makes participation in extracurricular activities difficult. Since I find the soul argument a little more interesting than the miracle one, and since I'm pressed on time, I'll respond to this side and let the other one rest.

Donald has used the analogy of the soul as software. Though he acknowledges the limitations of the analogy--e.g. that the soul is not simply stored information--I don't think that the limitations of the analogy have been made as clear as they should be. In fact, the analogy seems to result in a form of reductionism.

The point that I want to make about consciousness is twofold:
1. That the type of consciousness we have is intimately related to the types of (biological) beings that we are--that is, the specific type of physiology we have.
2. That the specific identity we have as a token instance of that type of consciousness, is intimately related to the particularities of that specific biological system (including, of course, the "recorded" history of one's biological system).

So, by way of analogy once again, it seems to me that Donald's argument amounts to this: we can take the liquidity of water, remove it, and place it into oil. That is, we can move a soul around, and put it into another body. But is it the same "liquidity" or soul at this point? Hasn't the identity of the phenomenon collapsed?

Numbers of problems arise in this idea. First of all, how can one possibly transport something that is not physical? Can you pick up digestion and move it around? Or is digestion a way of describing certain processes that are taking place? Don't misunderstand me, I think that some things can be transported even though they are not, strictly speaking, physical--we send information through the air waves all the time. But is the human form of life like that? Are humans the kinds of beings that can be removed from their bodies and moved through the air? Can humans be reduced to information that is simply copied and pasted onto something else? Secondly, even if we could put a particular instance of human consciousness into a body of the exact same type (human physiology), the question remains as to whether identity can remain without putting that particular instance into the particular physiology from which it both arose and was sustained. My argument is that identity collapses at this point.

In short, the idea of souls migrating sounds like a bit of science fiction that I'd prefer to abandon in favor of a more natural approach. I see no reason to believe anything other than that human consciousness is an aspect of particular biological systems, and when those systems which support it collapse and die, then consciousness, which was a product of it, collapses as well. If someone goes even a few minutes without oxygen, then if we get them back their "soul" is radically altered (in fact, both their brain and soul are "mush," if I may be so crude).

Human consciousness is a delicate thing, and cannot survive without the mother system that produced it initially. We can make analogies all day, but do we have any reason to believe that are analogies are anything more than wishful thinking? Do our analogies have ontological import, or are they clever ways of articulating our hope for something that we should learn to live without?

Tuesday, September 20, 2005

Debate Round 3: Donald on Miracles
Okay, it seems Skeptic and I mostly agree on the matter of scientifically impossible, but now I'm at a loss to understand Skeptic's initial assertion:
Though the belief in miracles was once a respectable, even rational, position to hold (given our ignorance), it is no longer laudable today. Must I ask: Do virgins give birth? Do donkey's speak? Do people rise up out of their graves? When or where have you seen this, but in your imagination?

He's saying that miracles are impossible, that it doesn't make any sense to believe in them, but as far as I can tell he's making an assertion rather than an argument. He admits that it is just as much of an argument from ignorance to say that an unexplained event has a naturalistic explanation as to say that it is miraculous. The sum total of his argument, as I understand it, is that when faced with an unexplained event, it is more logical to assume that there is a naturalistic explanation than that it is a miracle, as experience shows that most such events have a naturalistic explanation. Up to this point, I agree. (There is the matter of divine providence to consider, the belief that God is at work bringing about His will in all things, even the ones with naturalistic explanations, but I concur that this sort of evidence for God is circumstantial and cannot properly be called miraculous.) I don't think, however, that Skeptic's offered any reason to rule out miracles. He complains that he's never seen one. Neither have I. That should not be a prerequisite for belief in them, any more than seeing an electron should be a prerequisite for belief in them. Miracles are rare events, and most people will never see one. We may, however, have an opportunity to examine the evidence for one, but we'll save that for later.

Skeptic also asks about my definition of miracle. That's fair enough, so let me try to be clearer. My definition is that a miracle is an "observable interaction of a spiritual element with the otherwise closed system of matter and energy." I put it in scientific terms, and admittedly, I put it in such a way that it may describe things that don't look like miracles. We can't always know whether a spiritual element was involved. To use my subway analogy from Round 2, we may know that the data looks weird, but we need some more information before we can make a conclusion as to what's causing it. A more relevant question is not what I define as a miracle, but what sort of event would I believe to be a miracle.

Let's take the Resurrection of Jesus, the central miracle of the Christian faith. What's observable about it? Well, first there's the fact that Jesus is dead. That's a measurable, quantifiable fact, although I did not personally perform the measurement. Then he's alive. That's also measurable and quantifiable, although again measured by someone else. So that's what's observable about it. But is it spiritual? Is the fact that a man came to life after being dead for three days enough evidence that I can say that a spiritual hand was required to do the resurrecting? Probably not. The data certainly looks weird, and it's so far outside of what our naturalistic explanations can encompass, that I'd be considering the word "miracle" even with so little, but I'd want more evidence. What sort of evidence? Well, a couple of angels appearing at the tomb helps, although I might consider them delusions or just strangers who seemed angelic. Then there's the fact that Jesus had been predicting his death and resurrection months before it happened, and that he performed other resurrections by what he claimed was the power of God. And there's what he said after the event, showing up where and when he wanted, talking to crowds of people, interacting with them physically, albeit with a new and improved body. Jesus, the one who resurrected others and had now been resurrected, is the one who says that his resurrection is a miracle, God at work. That's pretty convincing, like when the subway workers told us that the trains had been running all through the night that corresponded to the noise in our data continuing unabated, whereas on other nights it had ceased when the subway had closed for the night. Now the word of the subway worker may not usually carry tremendous weight. I wouldn't ask him about the theological implications of evolution, not unless I had some other reason to trust his judgement on the matter. But when he's talking about something he should know about, he has no reason to lie, and it fits our data so perfectly, then it's fairly safe to believe him. Likewise, as Jesus is the one who can best explain the significance of the Resurrection, and it so neatly fits the data, then I accept his word that the Resurrection is miraculous.

And here is where I wonder what Skeptic believes. Would he accept the Resurrection as a miracle, assuming it happened as the Bible reports? Or would he insist that there was a naturalistic explanation? How far would he go to explain it? I've heard some pretty wild and implausible theories trying to explain the Resurrection, including alien intervention. How implausible do the naturalistic explanations have to get before the supernatural one simply makes more sense? If Skeptic takes the view that there must be a naturalistic explanation, then he's basing his conclusions on faith more than I am. If his position is instead that such a Resurrection would be a miracle, but he believes that it didn't happen that way, then we're having the wrong argument. He's not presenting arguments that there can be no miracles, only that he has no proof of miracles. If that's the case, we need to establish what criteria are necessary to prove a miracle and work from there.

Sunday, September 18, 2005

Debate Round 3: Donald on the Soul
It's been a week without any comments from me, since I've been busy working on my story. Even now, I'm only going to address one thread of Skeptic's argument, partly because I'm not sure it's a good idea to pursue both threads in a single post, and partly because the other topic is more complex and I haven't finished my response to it. Hopefully I'll have something up by Monday. Meanwhile, let me address the topic of the soul.

I'm not sure how Skeptic transitioned from my argument that the human person has two parts, body and soul, to the assumption that I believe there are three parts. As I read Skeptic's previous argument, he rejects that consciousness or mind is something distinct in itself. Instead, Skeptic takes the view that it is emergent, a result of the brain's cognition. I merely expressed my belief that the soul is not merely a manifestation of consciousness. It is something else. Consciousness is the result of the interaction of body and soul, it is, as Skeptic argues, emergent. As an analogy, consider a computer. A computer has both hardware and software. If, as a crude analogy, you consider the hardware to be the body and the software to be the soul, what I mean should become clearer. Obviously, software can't do much of anything without some hardware to run on, but without software, hardware has nothing to do. The distinctive behavior of a computer depends on both. But... software is not tied down to the computer. It needs a computer, certainly, but it can move from computer to computer, and behave in largely the same way as long as the computer is compatible and it can adapt to the differences. Software is a very different thing from hardware. Hardware, of course, can run different software, but its behavior changes vastly, as different software gives a completely different look and feel. Now, looking back at my earlier argument, which Skeptic seems to have forgotten, I never argued that the soul has much of an independent existence apart from the body. It's one of those matters I'm doctrinally neutral on. But I can see the soul being inactive until such time as a body is provided for it. Some body is necessary, but it is not necessarily identical to its former body. Thus the idea of God placing our souls in a resurrected body makes a lot of sense to me, in the same way that installing my old software on a new computer is perfectly reasonable, and something I've done before. This is, as I said, a crude analogy, and I'm not arguing that the soul is merely stored information or that it can be copied or deleted in the same way that software can, but I'm hoping it makes my position on the soul clearer.

Sunday, September 11, 2005

Debate Round 3: Skeptic
First Issue:

Apparently my use of the phrase “scientifically impossible” has generated some confusion, though, if I understand your reply, we seem to hold very similar beliefs on the matter. Nevertheless, it’s a fair observation. I will explain.

First of all, I’m well aware that science is a methodology, and that (strictly speaking) it makes little sense to speak of it as “impossible” or “possible.” I encounter a similar problem when people ask me, “What does philosophy say?” Philosophy, technically speaking, doesn’t “say” anything—-there is no set doctrine or beliefs, etc. But usually when people ask me such questions, I know to read between the lines a bit (something I was hoping my readers might do with the phrase “scientifically impossible” so that I wouldn’t have to go into lengthy explanations) and understand that what the speaker is really asking is something like: “According to sound philosophical methodology, and the general consensus among current philosophers who are using this method in its various capacities to understand the item under consideration, what is generally agreed upon to be the case?” In a similar manner, when I claimed that a miracle is commonly held to be something that is “scientifically impossible,” I intended to say that it is a phenomenon for which our current models have no significant or satisfactory explanatory powers. So, for example, if a trained chemist knows that mixing substance A with B, under specific conditions XYZ, always yields substance C, then the idea that mixing the two under those same circumstances and yet not coming up with substance C would be “impossible.” This is also why a scientifically minded individual, when he hears the Shaman say that his magic arts created the rain, will tend to ignore such claims and look elsewhere for an explanation. I may not be a scientist, but there’s nothing cryptic or naïve about this understanding of the scientist’s approach to knowledge. As you yourself have said, our scientific models, which are based solely on matter and energy, are unable to account for miracles. This is all I meant by “scientifically impossible,” and if you’d like for me to stop talking this way that’s fine with me. I just prefer “scientifically impossible” as short-hand in my distinction between different senses of the impossible (for example, I hold that a “resurrection” is not logically impossible (i.e. according to the rules of formal Logic, and what may be determined a priori), but that it is “scientifically impossible” (i.e. scientists do not have models that satisfactorily can account for any such occurrence). Conversely, I do consider “square circles” logically impossible, since the two concepts are conceptually at variance. Since “square circle” is a logical impossibility, I do not need to consult a posteriori procedures, such as science, to determine its tenability.

That issue aside, we seem to have another problem that is not simply a semantic entanglement. According to my understanding of your argument, you hold that: (1) simply because “science” (dare I use the word) cannot account for miracles, it does not follow that miracles are not real; and (2) we cannot, as you say, throw out the observations simply because our models for making sense out of them are unsatisfactory. My reply to this is two fold.

First of all, starting with (2), I am not aware of any “observations” or “effects” that are being ruled out because it doesn’t fit our models—-that is to say, I’ve never seen anything that I would consider to be a “miraculous” aberration from our perfectly natural explanations of things. People come to me all the time claiming that God worked a miracle for them, and once I probe them to find out about their alleged miracle, I find that there is nothing interesting to observe (for example, someone says that God healed them of cancer, but this was after certain treatments and such). Maybe there are “miracles” out there, but I’ve never been exposed to any of them, and when I investigate those who claim to have had them, I usually find poor deliberations, or even, in some cases, psychological instability in the observer. As for the second prong of that argument, number (1), (and supposing for the moment that we could find a miracle), you are absolutely right in holding that something might be real even if we cannot account for it in any kind of natural or scientific sense. Germs, for example, were very real in ancient times, even though humans had no way of accounting for the noticeable effects of germs in any kind of scientific/biological sense. But we must be careful that we do not commit the fallacy of drawing conclusions from the unknown.

If we encounter a phenomenon that it is unexplained, we cannot violate our epistemic boundaries by rushing ahead and providing explanations for it. For example, suppose we all see a dead man rise from the ground and begin walking about. The religious observers might want to say, “It’s a miracle of God! He was resurrected by the Almighty!” But the scientifically minded might want to say something like, “Well, this certainly is odd, but I just know that there has to be a perfectly natural explanation for this. Just wait long enough, and we’ll eventually have a scientific/natural/physical model that explains this otherwise perplexing occurrence.” Now the problem with this scenario is that both the “scientist” and the religious individuals have violated their epistemic boundaries—that is, they are committing the fallacy known as argumentum ad ignorantum (“appeal to ignorance”). What we have is an inexplicable phenomenon—-a dead man walking—-and yet both are drawing answers from the unknown: one says, “It’s a natural occurrence” and the other concludes, “It’s God.” Both parties are reasoning fallaciously. Why? Because the hard truth is that it currently is, well, unexplained!

The reason that I gave this example is to illustrate a few points. First of all, that we have no right to ontological claims (i.e. of things that exist, such as spiritual entities) which abrogate sound epistemological procedure (i.e. a procedure through which we may rightfully make a claim to knowledge). Now you can believe whatever you want, and we can make conjectures all day, but it would not count as an item of knowledge. This is precisely the problem with all God-talk. When asked to define “God,” religious people often say that he is invisible, intangible, non-physical, without taste, color, sound, or spatial properties, and that he is atemporal and eternal. This, of course, leaves the rest of us wondering what the difference might be between a God of that sort and one which doesn’t exist! Now, you claim that a miracle is “the observable interaction of a spiritual element within an otherwise closed system of matter and energy.” So at this point I must ask you two things: (1) what do you mean by “spiritual element” (how would you define it) and (2) in what sense do you claim that it is observable? If it is observable, is it observable in such a way that other “non-spiritual” models may account for the item in question? If so, why do you choose the “spiritual” explanation rather than the “non-spiritual” model?

As a final note, you said that I ruled out virgin births because it's illogical. But that's not quite true. I rule out virgin births primarily for the reason given above: I’ve never seen a virgin give birth, nor a snake talking in a garden, nor a dead man rising up out of his grave, nor an ass rebuking someone with a human voice. It is a matter of inductive, not deductive, reasoning that leads me away from such beliefs. As a side note, I’m aware that there have been virgins who have given birth, but this has been explained by biologists in such a way that precludes the miraculous intervention of a divine lover, as we find in so many of the ancient myths. Spiritual explanations have been slowly driven off the scene by “scientific” explanations (or natural/physical/observable explanations, if “scientific” offends you). At one point the stars were peepholes into heaven where the gods abode, and seasons changed by the will of the gods, and if you were ill it was because you angered a god, but now we know better.

Issue 2:

Before I answer your question about the soul, I’m going to need an explanation as to what you mean by “different substance” that adds its conscious thinking abilities to our mind. You claim that there is a physical substance, and a soul (or thinking thing) which arises from that physical substance—-so far so good—-but then there is also an entirely different substance called the spirit, which also thinks, and somehow blends its thinking together with that of the soul to create a composite thinking-thing. All of this is terribly cryptic to me. It is not enough to show that something is possible (if, indeed, you can do that); I want also to know how you came to find out about this alleged other substance, and what your justification for its reality is. In my experience, there are only two types of things—-commonly referred to as body/mind or, in some places, body/soul. We are all familiar with the physical dimension of our person, and as beings which think, we are all certainly aware of the mind/soul part. But what is this additional thinking-spirit thing and how does it mix with the other conscious parts? Also, what does it mean to be human? Must you have all three parts? When the physical dies, do the other two thinking parts go on? If so, does it make any sense to say that “you” went on living now that the physical part is dead? In other words, if to be “John” means to have all three elements, then even if the physical part dies, so has John. Perhaps something went on living, but whatever it was, it wasn’t John (because John just is mind/soul/spirit substance). So explain to me what these three parts are, how you discovered them, how they work together, and which parts are essential to an individual's identity.

Wow, I apologize for the length of this. I’ll try to be more pithy from now on.
Debate Round 2: Donald
While my degree is in Electrical Engineering, what I actually did can best be called experimental physics. (I also did some theoretical physics, but I am most definitely an experimentalist, not a theoretician.) And what strikes me most about Skeptic's argument on miracles is that his definition of scientific deviates significantly from that of the practicing scientist. There's an old joke that goes, "An engineer thinks equations approximate the real world. A physicist thinks the real world approximates equations. A mathematician is unable to make the connection."

Skeptic talks a bit about nonsense phrases. "Scientifically impossible" is one such phrase. Science is a method of making observations about the world, and creating models to explain such observations. That is all science is. There is no such thing as impossible for science. There are only observations which fit the current model and observations which do not. When the observations do not fit the model, you do not discard the observations, you discard the model--or, if possible, you adapt the model to fit the observations. If you are unable to do so, you take more observations, accounting for all influencing factors and minimizing the ones you can't account for, until you have enough information to work out a model. If that proves beyond your means--as it often does in real science--you publish your results and hope that someone else can explain your observations. You cannot a priori make the decision that virgins giving birth and people rising from the dead won't be allowed observations because they're illogical, any more than you can ignore evidence that an electron can be in two places at once or that distances change depending on how fast you're moving, simply because they're illogical. I consider the first two a lot less nonsensical than the latter two, but the latter two are observed scientific facts which we've developed models to account for. If we had continued to discard these observations because they didn't make sense, as we did initially, then all of modern physics wouldn't have happened, and I'd be writing this on paper and sending it through the mail rather than typing it on my laptop and posting it on the Internet.

Now, it is true that when a scientist is performing scientific experiments, he often discards some of the data. He doesn't discard this data because it is illogical or unscientific; he discards it because it is caused by something outside of the system he's trying to model. The Universe is simply too vast and complex to model the entire thing. Instead, scientists look at smaller closed systems, systems for which there is no outside influence, and create models for those, ignoring the rest of the Universe. Unfortunately, it's impossible to create a completely closed system, and even if it were, performing measurements on it opens it up anyway. Scientists usually settle for a small, or at least well-defined, outside influence. When my research group was doing the experiments which went into my Ph.D. thesis, we discovered that the data was very noisy throughout most of the day, with lots of apparently random deviations from what we expected. However, late at night, from about 1 am to 5 am, the data became very clean--the noise went away. By doing this over several nights, we realized that this noise corresponded to the times during which Boston's subway was running (the proof was that during the one night that the subway continued to operate for maintenance purposes, the noise never went away). We concluded that the electrical current running through the third rail of the subway system was creating an inconstant magnetic field, giving us noisy measurements. We decided to discard the data we got while the subway was running, not because the subway wasn't a real influence causing real deviations in our measurements, but because the subway was not part of the closed system we were trying to model, and we didn't have the means (or the desire) to add the subway to the model.

Getting back to the subject of miracles, I agree with Skeptic that defining a miracle as something which is "scientifically impossible" is nonsensical, but for the entirely different reason that the phrase "scientifically impossible" is nonsense. However, I don't think a miracle is simply something outside the current scientific model, which seems to be his approach, defining it as something merely unusual or strange. I'd take a more, ahem, scientific approach. The only truly closed system is the Universe itself, but only because it is defined that way, as the whole closed system of matter and energy. Anything that affects the Universe is considered a part of it. (Technically, any spiritual influence which may or may not exist is part of the Universe by that definition, but most scientists dislike including it, since it's such a wildcard. So we'll define Universe slightly differently, as the whole system of matter and energy.) Many scientists take the view that, in principle, the entire Universe (per our definition) can be modeled, even if it will be forever beyond our means to do so. I actually agree that the whole system of matter and energy can be modeled, but I don't believe this system is truly a closed one.

I define a miracle as the observable interaction of a spiritual element with the otherwise closed system of matter and energy. Any model based solely on matter and energy, as our scientific models are, will not be able to account for miracles, any more than the model of my quantum system could account for the Boston subway. That does not make the spiritual element any less real, or the resulting miracle any less observable, just beyond the scope of the model. There is, of course, the question of whether you can build a model which includes the spiritual. It would be hard to do, as we don't know of any way to observe the spiritual, only its effects, but that's never stopped science before. Dark matter and dark energy are wholly theoretical constructs to explain observed effects for which we haven't yet observed any cause. However, any model which includes a freely acting, conscious entity--such as God or even humans--is notoriously difficult to construct with any precision, which is why scientists prefer to leave that sort of stuff, when encountered on the human scale, to the soft sciences of sociology and psychology. Similarly, they leave models including spiritual influences to the soft sciences of theology and philosophy. The hard sciences deal only with systems which are closed to the messy influence of conscious entities.

As for the second matter Skeptic discusses, the emergent view of consciousness, I think I understand what he is saying. However, I don't think he addresses my question. In Skeptic's original argument, he said that it was absurd to think consciousness could be separated from the body. His argument for the emergent view of consciousness is simply that consciousness is a property of the physical system of the brain, such as liquidity is a property of water. My immediate instinct is to point out that there are other liquids besides water. I don't regard the soul as pure consciousness, but as a thing of spirit, a substance of another type, which may have consciousness, just as methanol and acetone are other substances besides water which have liquidity. The liquidity of acetone and methanol is not the same as the liquidity of water, and likewise I think the consciousness of the soul is not the same as the consciousness of the body. Now I take the view that human consciousness is a product of both body and soul, and that separating them gives you something less than the product. This is mere assertion at this point in the argument. However, so is Skeptic's assertion that there can be no consciousness without the body, yet he adds that it is absurd to think that there can be. He has not yet addressed why he thinks it is absurd.
Debate Round 2: Skeptic
I'll respond to two issues as well.

First of all, the issue of miracles is a tricky matter because people often vacillate (well, let's be realists about it, they equivocate) on the use of "miracle." Some use "miracle" to mean a thing that is extraordinary, such as the "miracle of birth" or the "miracle of water being assimilated by a vine and turned into a grape that produces wine." This first definition is a silly way, I think, to get miracles on the scene (in a scientific sense). Anyone could believe in a "miracle" of this sort. But then there is the second idea of miracle in which a miracle is something that is impossible in a scientific sense. Now if one pays close attention not only to the metaphysical assumptions, but also the grammar of the assertion, then one will realize that miracles are excluded as a logical possibility in this latter sense. To say that a scientific miracle is possible would be like uttering some kind of nonsensical phrase like, "The impossible is possible" or "God could make a married bachelor" or "I found a square circle." When we speak nonsense, we are embracing metaphysical nonsense. This, I think, was the great achievement of Ludwig Wittgenstein: he showed us that to permit grammatical errors is to commit a metaphysical one as well. But suppose we did have an unexplained event. Could we then explain it by saying, "It was God"? What else would that be but to transgress our epistemic boundaries and commit ourselves to drawing a conclusion from ignorance of what caused the event? The only conclusion that one is warranted to draw from an unexplained, or mysterious event, is that it is, well, unexplainable! Anything more would commit the logical fallacy referred to as argumentum ad ignorantum.

So miracles in a scientific sense are out. But before dismissing the idea of miracles, we need to ask ourselves a very, very important question: When the ancients spoke of miracles, were they referring to the abeyance of scientific laws, or were they referring to something like the first idea of miracles that I provided--i.e. some wondrous, awe-inspiring thing (such as childbirth)? My response to this question is in concert with a number of theologians who point out that the alleged miracles of antiquity were of the awe-inspiring kind and not the deviation-from-science kind. Why? Because the miracles they spoke of took place during the pre-scientific era. It is impossible to speak of miracles as that which defies scientific laws when there is no such thing as scientific laws (in our modern sense of scientific laws). There were, of course, rules of thumb and regularities, but the ancients did not live in the same world that we do now--and by that I mean something like this: that if they saw a man foaming at the mouth and rolling on the ground, they could not see epilepsy. Why? Because, if you have an ear to hear it, "epilepsy" did not exist--that is, such an interpretation was not even an option or possibility; it never occurred to them or entered their mind; it was debarred from their social reality. It was not a possibility in the same way that it is not a possibility for us today to see a demon-possessed individual. If we see a man foaming at the mouth and rolling on the ground today, we see some form of mental disorder, not a demon. In short, the ancients did not make a distinction between science and miracle because there was no scientific context in which miracles could gain traction as an antagonizing force to science. Hence, the ancients did not mean "miracle as opposed to science"--they meant something else. To the ancients, a miracle was something that inspired awe, wonder, amazement, and that baffled them. Today, we have explained much that was not possible for them to understand. Though the belief in miracles was once a respectable, even rational, position to hold (given our ignorance), it is no longer laudable today. Must I ask: Do virgins give birth? Do donkey's speak? Do people rise up out of their graves? When or where have you seen this, but in your imagination? The ancients could see a nymph darting through the woods, but today when a man tells us he sees Big Foot in the woods, we simply laugh.

Now for the second matter. You have accused me of being a materialist. I say "accused" to imply that I, too, have a certain disdain for materialism (it implicitly denies that I am conscious via its reductionism). Allow me to state clearly that I am not a materialist: I am a property dualist (notice that I did not say substance dualist). What this means is that I hold that there is only one kind of substance in the world, but that this one substance has the ability generate properties which are not reducible to the physical constituents themselves--and one of these properties I call "consciousness."

I will explain what I mean by using an analogy. When a person considers water, we make a distinction between its physical properties (hydrogen and oxygen) and its emergent properties (liquidity, or slipperyness, if you will). There is only one substance, not two; but this one substance has two kinds of properties--i.e. physical properties and non-physical properties. Certainly you would not want to say that there are two substances at play with each other here: the hydrogen-oxygen compound and then the liquidity, which is its own kind of substance! As you know,since these physical particles are combined in certain ways (forming atoms and molecules of various sorts and in various arrangements) there has been a new emergent property created: liquidity. But I must ask: is the property of liquidity, or a water's slippery-ness, a different substance altogether? Can there be liquidity without hydrogen and oxygen? More specifically and to the point: can the emergent property of liquidity separate itself from the physical parts of hydrogen and oxygen and become its own substance? Certainly, it cannot. In the same way, consciousness cannot separate itself from the physical particles that work together in homeostasis to support the "property" of consciousness.
Debate Round 1: Donald
I won't try to address all of Skeptic's points right away, but I will focus on two of them.

First off, on the matter of the uniqueness of the virgin birth--well, the simple truth is that the story is not unique. The claim of demigod is not new, although in most of the stories sexual relations between mortal and immortal are implied. Okay, in most of them it's made very explicit. However, in others, such as Romulus and Remus being born from Rhea Silvia after she was visited by Mars in the form of a golden rain, her virginity is left intact. Here's a bit of what came out of one of my earlier discussions comparing the Christian virgin birth story with those of other mythologies:
One approach to this question, which I think C.S. Lewis has proposed, is to say that the Christian account is the ultimately true one, and the accounts found elsewhere are echos or shadows of this truth that reside deep inside the minds and souls of even unregenerate people. This view has the advantage that miracle stories in other religions don't have to be seen as satanic or as threats to the validity of the Bible.

A quick caveat for the above quote--this comes from the Skeptics Anonymous page at MIT. This is (or rather was, as it's now defunct) a form that allows people to ask spiritual and theological questions of MIT's Graduate Christian Fellowship, which we would field to our discussion e-mail list. There would then be a lively debate, and then someone (usually me), would compile the answers and send it to the person who asked (if they gave us an e-mail), and someone else (whoever the webmaster was) would put the answer on the webpage. I had a hand in answering most of the questions. However, the question as it appears on the webpage is generalized from the question actually asked, and some of the answers aren't necessarily as general as the question. The one on marriage in particular refers to a question about a specific case, which is not described on the page.

The second question I'll address is Skeptic's reluctance to separate body from soul, another matter I've thought about before, and I mention it on my blog, although only in passing. This is a subject which Roz Picard, a professor studying AI at MIT, spoke about to the Graduate Christian Fellowship, and her thinking did much to shape mine. She pointed out, like Skeptic, that while the Bible does refer to the soul, it doesn't make a clear distinction and describe the soul as a separate entity, as we do today. The two words most commonly used for soul are pneumatos, meaning breath, and psychos, meaning life or self, and neither clearly describes a separate entity. Therefore, I think that modern thought is probably wrong. The thing I discovered when looking into this is that what I think of as modern religious belief is really the popular religious belief common in the US today, and it is not universal. Most people do not think deeply of such things, but those who do come to differing conclusions, and the belief that soul does not have a separate existence, that physical death is in effect non-existence until resurrection, is respectable in the scholarly Christian community. Not too long ago, there was a lively debate on this matter, which included three different views of the state of the soul separated from the body: non-existence, conscious existence, and something in between. Note that all three acknowledge the importance of the bodily resurrection, and that there's something wrong with a soul without a body, but they all take different views of what the soul without the body is like. I am personally undecided on the exact nature of the body and the soul. I take a view closest to Jeremy Pierce's: that the soul can exist without the body, but that its existence is incomplete and not fully conscious. It's something I play with in my fiction. I don't think the soul is meant to have an independent existence from the body, and therefore studies of the influence of genetics and physiology on personality and psychology don't really bother me.

As I read what Skeptic says, he takes the purely materialistic view of the mind, that there is nothing more to us than our physical bodies. Here I'd disagree, and I wonder that he concludes that the very existence of the soul is ludicrous with what we know today. I don't see what we've learned that disproves the soul. I believe in its existence, and even if it is not an independent entity in itself, our lives are more than the physical. Therefore I can also accept the possibility of beings of pure spirit, even if we are not so ourselves, beings such as angels and demons and, yes, God.
Debate Round 1: Skeptic's Opening
The problem is not a problem with Jesus per se, but with the metaphysical belief in dis-embodied conscious states. Spirits, which I take to be no different from conscious/thinking things (after all, what survives after you die but that part of you which thinks?) cannot be separated from the biological, causal systems which produce those conscious states. Now, one of the things I've always admired about the Christian tradition is its appreciation (except in recent times) of the flesh. Even the supposed resurrection of Jesus is understood to be a bodily resurrection. But since the 19th century, Christianity has become excessively Platonic in its understanding of the duality of mind and body--that is, they no longer believe that consciousness is simply a distinct property of physical systems, but wish to go further by declaring that it is a substance all to itself (indeed, even one that can shed its physiology completely!). This is absurd. It is one thing for the thinkers of ancient times (e.g. Plato, and perhaps Pythagoras) to believe that mind can be separated from body, but this view has become untenable (or at least unsupportable) in our post-modern world. We've learned too much about how things work.

Does God exist? Well, perhaps in some form or other, depending on how one wishes to define "God". But suffice it to say that Jesus is no more a Son of God than Caesar, or Alexander the Great, or anyone else who has been claimed as such (and many of these were also held to have been born through a mystical union of a god and a mortal woman--i.e. a virgin birth). In short, the question of God's existence is still an open question for me, but the divinity of Jesus is not. My goal in studying theology at this juncture in my life is, in fact, to reach a definitive assessment of the value of Christianity--both as it was practiced, and as it is currently practiced today (and the two are by no means the same!)

Thursday, September 8, 2005

The Great Debate
I've recently been engaged with an e-mail debate on theology and philosophy with an agnostic friend of a friend. It's been fascinating, covering a wide range of topics, from the nature of the soul to whether the definition of miracle includes scientific impossibility. I've convinced him to make our debate public, posting it on this blog. I should have the first installment online tomorrow. Since I want to be sure I don't mangle his arguments, I'm going to make him a guest co-blogger, and let him post his own thoughts. Since he prefers anonymity, he will be blogging under the pseudonym Skeptic. The debate posts will indicate that they are part of the debate in the title, and will be part of a Religious Debate category. In anticipation of this, I've moved the byline up to the top of the posts, just below the title, so you'll know who's writing the post from the beginning.

It's been a while since I've been in a good debate, and I'm looking forward to it continuing.