Back of the Envelope

In the Winter 2004 issue of IEEE's Technology and Society magazine, there's an article by Jurgen Altmann and Mark Gubrud titled "Anticipating Military Nanotechnology." (The article is not available online.) The article is not so much speculation about future nanotechology (NT) which the military will be using, as it is about the need for international controls on nanotechnology. I don't really agree with the authors, for a number of reasons. Let's start with their quick rundown of what nanotechnology may be able to do:

More specific military applications include new propellants and explosives of higher energy density, and miniaturized guidance systems for small munitions. Nanostructured material could bring improved armor penetrators and some strengthening of light armor. Firearms could gain range and accuracy at reduced weight. Small missiles could become practicle even against human targets.
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NT and microsystems technology would permit vehicles and mobile robots of decimeter down to millimeter size, some using biomimetic forms of propulsion. One variant would be to use small animals (rats, insects) controlled by implanted electrodes. Although the munitions payload of small robots would be limited, they could attack at senstive spots, or act in swarms to achieve a mass effect...

Implants in soldiers' bodies could monitor their health status, and release drugs for therapy--or to influence performance and mood. Identification, communication, or espionage devices could be implanted to keep them hidden. Another type of implant would use electrodes to contact nerves and the brain to reduce reaction time and to communicate sensory impressions or (simple) information.

NT approaches could soon lead to extensions of chemical and biological warfare. Nanoparticles designed to ferry therapeutic drugs across the blood-brain barrier or to concentrate in certain organs could as well deliver harmful substances. A mechanism developed to kill cancer cells after recognition of a mutant gene or protein could be used to target (or spare) a certain group, possibly even a certain individual, on the basis of either genetic factors or some separately administered biochemical marker...

If this sounds like sci-fi, it is. The authors readily admit that these technologies are decades away, and may prove impractical to implement. It is true that there are people seriously considering how to implement such technologies, however.

These technologies are cause for some concern to the authors: "New technology can make old treaties seem out of date, and can thereby tempt states to abrogate or disregard them." They fear that international law, a term which I find inaccurate at best, cannot keep up with the new technology. Further, they worry about destabilization:

Small, highly accurate and lethal weapons may encourage offensive uses. Deterrence would be weakened if strategic forces could be attacked by non-nuclear means such as stealthy, precision-guided weapons or miniaturized systems covertly infiltrated in advance of an attack. Autonomous systems of confronting powers operating at close mutual range at sea or in space would need to detect and react quickly to any attack, creating potentials for accidental war and uncontrolled escalation.

Their proposed solution? Cooperative International Regulation. They propose the following guidelines:

• Existing arms control and disarmament treaties and humanitarian internaional law should be upheld (and updated where needed). In particular the Biological Weapons Convention should be strengthened by a verification protocol.
• All kinds of space weapons should be banned, possibly with special rules for nonweapons use of small satellites and carriers.
• Autonomous 'killer robots' should be prohibited; a human should be the decision maker when a target is to be attacked.
• Small, mobile artificial systems (including biological-technical hybrid systems) should be severely restricted, allowing only exceptional use (such as search of collapsed buildings).
• Body implants that are not directly medically motivated should be subject to a renewable moratorium of ten years' duration.

I actually believe the third one is reasonable, if hard to enforce, as it's essentially a programming question of whether the robot attacks without human permission. But I have my doubts about some of the foundational reasoning behind these proposals. They argue that one of the things they want to do is keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, "Most of the specific applications which could be abused... would require large R&D programs to bring to fruition. Terrorist groups are unlikely to be able to obtain such systems unless the capable states develop and deploy them to scale." This would make sense if there were no such thing as state-sponsored terrorism. We aren't too worried about terrorists stealing US nuclear weapons. We are very worried about the Iranian government developing nuclear weapons (with help previously received from sympathizers in Pakistan) and handing them to the terrorist groups they sponsor. This brings me to the most questionable paragraph in the article:

If international limits can be agreed to, including verification and enforcement mechanisms, it is reasonable to expect that they can be implemented. All technological societies already take measures to reduce toxic emissions, improve safety, and otherwise balance costs and benefits; new measures are introduced every year as technology evolves.

The key point the authors seem to be missing is that any new arms control agreement is unlikely to be more successful than the current arms control agreements. You know, the ones countries like Iraq, Lybia, Iran, and North Korea have spent years making a mockery of, pretending to go along with while working on these technologies in secret? Any arms control agreement depends on the honor of the participants, and when it comes to the realpolitik of international relations, cheating is the norm. I don't trust any nation not to make full use of whatever wriggle room these treaties allow, and I sure don't trust the likes of Iran and North Korea to make a goodwill attempt to follow even the letter of the law. Perhaps fifty years down the road, when Iran and North Korea and tyrannies around the world have become liberal democracies (gee, I'm optimistic, aren't I?), then I'll see the value of such international treaties. But I just don't see that happening anytime soon.